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DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:
A POLISH PERSPECTIVE
Ludwik Florek*
I. INTRODUCTION
The changes in Poland and other East European countries feature
both the transition from a totalitarian Communist State to a demo-
cratic society and the transition from a centrally planned economy to a
market economy. Both goals are closely connected with the transfor-
mation of industrial relations and the resulting need for labor regula-
tion reform.
This essay addresses three issues. The author first describes the
major features of the previous Polish industrial relations system which
caused it to be undemocratic. He then presents arguments justifying
the need for a democracy in industrial relations in Poland. Second,
the indispensable premises and elements of three basic democratic in-
stitutions of industrial relations are identified: trade union freedom,
collective bargaining and the right to strike. These elements were se-
lected for analysis on the basis of international legal instruments, in
particular, conventions of the International Labor Organization
("ILO"), as well as U.S. and West European labor legislation. The
author then shows the significance of these three basic democratic in-
stitutions in the Polish labor context. Finally, the author analyzes the
problems and difficulties of introducing democratic collective bargain-
ing and the right to strike into Polish labor relations.
The labor regulations existing before 1980 reflected the dominant
role of the State, as ruled by the Communist party, and State owner-
ship of industrial enterprises.' As a result, trade unions were a part of
the Communist establishment. The unions were organized centrally
and headed very often by high party functionaries (members of the
* Professor Dr. jur., University of Warsaw Law School. This article is based on research
done in the United States at the University of Michigan Law School and is sponsored partially by
the NATO Democratic Institutions Program. Special thanks go to Danetta L. Beaushaw for
editing the article's language.
1. For a description of previous Polish industrial relations, see Matey, Poland, in 10 INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 139-75 (R.
Blanpain ed. 1988); Szubert, New Trends in Polish Labour Relations, 12 COMP. LAB. L. 62, 62-64
(1990).
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Politburo). The establishment of new trade unions outside of the offi-
cial trade union structure was prohibited, thereby preventing the de-
velopment of trade union pluralism. In addition, the role of trade
unions was limited by the factual prohibition of strikes and restricted
collective bargaining - wages and other terms of employment were
determined by State legislation and decisions of the State administra-
tion while collective agreements served only to supplement them.
From 1980 to 1982, trade union freedom and a defacto right to strike
were allowed by law, but were suspended after the imposition of mar-
tial law in December 1981. In the following years, the authorities at-
tempted to change the collective labor law and industrial relations in
Poland, even if they were to be adjusted to the changing Communist
system. In 1982, a collective labor disputes settlement procedure and a
very limited right to strike were introduced.2 These legal regulations
did not play a large role because most strikes were conducted outside
of the law in force. In 1986, new legislation on collective agreements
was passed.3 It was not, however, applied practically. Enterprises kept
trying to increase employee wages on the basis of their internal wage
regulations, and although some formally had the character of enter-
prise agreements, the majority of the cases were concluded without
actual "bargaining." '4 The State administration continued to block
these increases by imposing an especially drastic remuneration tax
which still exists in a modified form.
In 1989, after the "Round Table" talks, 5 trade union pluralism was
allowed 6 and "Solidarity" was re-legalized. Other industrial relations
institutions were not changed. As a result, Poland now faces major
changes, in particular, changes in collective labor legislation. The role
of this legislation is different than in many countries where practice
first shaped industrial relations and the law subsequently, sanctioned
2. Ustawa o Zwiazkach Zawodoych, arts. 33-46, 32 DZIENNIK USTAW [hereinafter JOUR-
NAL OF LAWS] item 216 (1982) (Polish Trade Union Act of October 8, 1982, with further
amendments) (hereinafter 1982 Trade Union Act]; 54 JOURNAL OF LAWS, item 277 (1985) (uni-
fied text); but see Act Respecting Trade Unions, International Labour Organization, Legislative
Series, Pol. 1 (1982).
3. 0 Zmianie Ustawy-Kodeks Pracy, 42 JOURNAL OF LAWS, item 201 (1986) (Amendment
of the Labor Code on Collective Agreements of November 26, 1986); Ustawa-Kodeks Pracy, 24
JOURNAL OF LAWS, supra note 2, item 141 (1974) (Labor Code - Decree of June 26, 1974, with
further amendments) [hereinafter 1974 Labor Code]; THE LABOR CODE OF THE POLISH PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC (M. Matey trans. 1979) (English translation).
4. In centrally planned economies, collective bargaining was defined not as a conflictual pro-
cess, but as a means of ensuring full cooperation between enterprise managers and workers in
carrying out economic and social plans. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, 2 WORLD LA-
BOUR REPORT 49 (1985).
5. The Round Table Talks were a round of political negotiations between the last Commu-
nist government and Solidarity, in addition to opposition leaders.
6. Amendment of the 1982 Trade Union Act, 20 JOURNAL OF LAWS, item 105 (1982).
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developments of practice. In Poland and other East European coun-
tries, the law in force regulates, often in a very detailed way, most
aspects of industrial relations and imposes certain restrictions on those
relations. For this reason, the law was not respected in the past.7 In
order that the law be observed, it must be changed quickly. Expedi-
ency is also necessary since the new collective labor law can contribute
to the development of economic and industrial relations. It is worth
mentioning that statutory law will primarily regulate change in the
early stages of this process because Poland and other countries of
Eastern Europe have a continental European legal tradition marked
by the dominant role of statutory law established by the Parliament.
II. THE NEED FOR DEMOCRATIC LABOR RELATIONS
A basic question, therefore, arises: what will the new Polish labor
legislation and industrial relations be like? There is no precise and de-
finitive answer to this question due to the many factors exerting influ-
ence on the shape of labor law and industrial relations. The most
important of these factors are: privatization, the overcoming of the
economic crisis and' the introduction of a market economy. The only
real requirement is that the legal framework of future Polish industrial
relations should be democratic.
The need for democratic industrial relations in Poland can be justi-
fied in many ways. First, the previous system of industrial relations
can be evaluated negatively. Previous industrial relations rules did not
prove capable of regulating relations between employees, enterprises,
trade unions and State administration. In this area, Poland and other
East European countries have experienced, for a long time, quite seri-
ous tensions and difficulties. The previous model of industrial relations
also has not ensured the sufficient protection of the workers' interests.
In particular, it has not safeguarded social justice, which according to
the Marxist tradition was to be one of the main distinguishing features
of the Communist system as compared to the Capitalist system. Sec-
ond, the success of political democracy now being instituted in Poland
is impossible without industrial democracy.8 Accordingly, it is obvious
7. The non-observance of law could be considered a positive thing from the political point of
view (e.g., contributing to the dismantling of the Communist system in Eastern Europe, begin-
ning with the wave of illegal strikes in Poland in May 1988). It should be evaluated differently,
however, in a democratic society. In terms of social peace, it is better to have a permanent organ-
ized labor force instead of temporary strike committees often elected spontaneously during labor
disputes.
8. Since freedom of association is an important element of political democracy, it is included
in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 22, paragraph 1) and is
guaranteed occasionally in constitutions of various countries. See Ziskind, Labor Law in 143
Constitutions, I COMP. LAB. L. 205 (1976); J. JAVILLIER, MANUEL DE DROIT DU TRAVAIL 25
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that democracy is indivisible and cannot be guaranteed in an isolated
sector of public life. It should be remembered that, in the past decade,
the democratization of Polish industrial relations played a decisive
role in political change. This democratization was supported by many
workers9 who are still striving to achieve liberal industrial relations.
Third, democratic industrial relations constitute an important factor
of a market economy.' 0 This does not mean that trade unions always
contribute to political- democracy, or that collective bargaining and
strikes always contribute to a market economy. Instead, it is suggested
that political freedom is impossible without freedom of association and
that a genuine market cannot work without a free setting of wages and
other terms of employment. Democracy in industrial relations, how-
ever, makes it possible to safeguard and promote workers' interests,
particularly important in times of economic crises which result in high
unemployment. Fourth, Poland also has a certain prewar tradition of
democratic industrial relations. " Fifth, the introduction of democracy
in industrial relations is also justified by international factors. Poland
ratified all the basic Conventions of the ILO concerning industrial re-
lations (except ILO Convention No. 154 of 1981 concerning collective
bargaining) and both Human Rights Covenants. The international ob-
ligations resulting from these documents create a democratic pattern
of industrial relations. In addition, if Poland wants to extend its inter-
national trade' 2 and cooperation, and in particular to join the Euro-
pean Community, it will have to adjust its industrial relations to
Western democratic standards.
(1986) ("[L]a possibiliti d'expression des divergences d'intfrts entre employeurs et salaries, en-
tre patronat et syndicats, constitue un 616ment essentiel de la d6mocratie politique. ... ).
9. It is also worth mentioning that, in the past, owing to the lack of different political and
social organizations, plant workforces were the only organized social groups able to protest.
Thanks to the fact that they existed in great numbers, they were protected against sanctions
which would be enforced against individuals or small political parties.
10. See Summers, The Usefulness of Unions in a Major Industrial Society - a Comparative
Sketch, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (1984) on the functions of unions in West Germany, Sweden
and Great Britain ("[F]irst, the political function - that is, the union's role in the elective and
administrative processes of the government; second, the general economic function of structuring
the labor market; third, the specific economic function of obtaining benefits for its members;
and fourth, the 'industrial' democracy function of bringing justice, participation, and humane
concerns to the workplace.").
11. See J. BLOCH, LABOUR LEGISLATION AND SOCIAL INSURANCE IN POLAND 248-59
(1945). Poland, as distinct from other communist countries of Eastern Europe, took over the pre-
1939 legal system (for example the 1937 Law on Collective bargaining was in force and partially
applied until 1974), assuring only and all necessary completion, modification and interpretation
consistent with the needs and goals of a communist system. See Matey, Essential Traits of Social-
ist Labor Codes, 2 CoMP. LAB. L. 191 (1977).
12. For example, for many years the United States has tended to include international fair
labor standards into its trade treaties. See Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor
Law. the U.S. Approach, 9 COMp. LAB. L. 253, 261 (1988).
[Vol. 12:621
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The introduction of democratic industrial relations, however, re-
quires interpretation of this notion. Interpretation is not simple since
so many different meanings and forms exist, a multiplicity especially
visible when comparing different Western systems of labor law and
industrial relations. 13
The notion of "industrial democracy," having been used in West-
ern countries since the beginning of this century,' 4 is only slightly use-
ful because it is understood in different ways.II For example, the
notion of industrial democracy could be associated with collective bar-
gaining as in the United States,' 6 or with workers' participation in de-
cision-making within undertakings as in most European countries, 17
especially in Germany' 8 and in Sweden 19 but also in Great Britain.20
For this reason, industrial democracy can be viewed as either "par-
ticipatory" or "representational." ' 21 Regardless of its meaning, the
13. See, e.g., Diubler, Comparison of Labor Law in Socialist and Capitalist Systems, 4 CoMp.
LAB. L. 79 (1981); LABOUR LAW RESEARCH IN TWELVE COUNTRIES (S. Edlund ed. 1986);
Treu, European Unification and Italian Labor Relations, 11 CoMP. LAB. L. 441 (1990).
14. The "industrial democracy" movement commenced out of the social gospel movement
before the turn of the century and flowered after World War I, especially in the 1920s. See M.
DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 1865-1965, at 109-96 (1970).
15. See Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23 (1984) (industrial democracy
can be viewed as either "participatory" or "representational"); Comment, Industrial Democracy
and the Managerial Employee Exception to the National Labor Relations Act, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
441, 441-42 (1985) ("[Industrial democracy] includes the concept that can also be called work-
place democracy: the ability of employees through their representatives to shape the form and
content of their employment. In this sense, industrial democracy entails worker participation in
the decisions that mold their employment. In its most idealized form, workplace democracy
means that employees cooperate with management in running the company."). See also J.
WrrrE, DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY, AND ALIENATION IN WORK 3 (1980) ("Industrial democ-
racy implies .. .a set of decision-making mechanisms based on a reasonable assumption of
political equality.").
16. Modern American industrial relations courses tend to depict the Wagner Act as primar-
ily an effort to promote "industrial democracy" through collective bargaining. See Mitchell,
Inflation, Unemployment, and the Wagner Act: A Critical Reappraisal, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1065
(1986). See also Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle against Racism:
Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157, 165 (1982).
17. Since just after World War II, most countries of Western Europe "have required work-
ers' representation in undertakings over a certain size, whether the workers concerned demanded
it or not. The constitution, powers and effectiveness of these representative bodies vary greatly
from one country to another and from one industry to another." See I. MACBEATH, THE EURO-
PEAN APPROACH TO WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS 4 (1973). These committees are
often referred to in English as "works councils." As a concept, works councils can be traced back
in German history as far as 1848, when they were proposed by the constitutional assembly at
Frankfurt. Mueckenberger, Juridification of Industrial Relations: a German-British Comparison,
9 CoMP. LAB. L. 526, 528 n.7 (1988).
18. See Richardi, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in the Federal Re-
public of Germany, 5 COMp. LAB. L. 23 (1982).
19. See Bergqvist, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in Sweden, 5
COMP. LAB. L. 65 (1982).
20. 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
219 (R. Blanpain ed. 1986).
21. See Finkin, supra note 15, at 48.
Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 12:621
concept "industrial democracy" is usually cited in vague and general
terms. Similarly, many other terms used in the literature of labor law
and industrial relations, such as "workplace democracy, ' 22 "social
justice,' 23 "industrial pluralism, '24 "social harmony," "industrial har-
mony" and "industrial peace" 25 also have many meanings, and as a
result, little value for our consideration.
In addition, a general definition of democracy, a "form of govern-
ment in which the sovereign power resides in and is exercised by the
whole body of free citizens directly or indirectly through a system of
representation, as distinguished from a monarchy, aristocracy or oli-
garchy,"' 26 only partially suits industrial relations. Even though indus-
trial democracy has provided millions of workers with an effective
voice in industrial government 27 and changed the traditional labor re-
lationship, 28 ownership 29 and management are "non-democratic" in
the sense that a hierarchical control of the workplace is necessary, and
that mobility of capital must be protected. 30 It is evident that the par-
22. D. ZWERDLING, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY (1980); Klare, Workplace Democracy &
Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
23. Pope, Labor and the Constitution: from Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV.
1071, 1087 n.ll0 (1987) ("The social justice for which we are striving is an incident of our
democracy, not the main end. It is rather the result of democracy - perhaps its finest expression
- but it rests upon democracy, which implies the rule by the people. And therefore the end for
which we must strive is the attainment of rule by the people, and that involves industrial democ-
racy as well as political democracy.").
24. Fox, PA TCO and the Courts: Public Sector Labor Law as Ideology, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV.
245, 257 n.44 ("Most of the American labor movement since World War II has accepted many of
the values and assumptions of industrial pluralism ....").
25. Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee Strikes, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV.
590, 594 (1985) ("Since [the Great Depression], 'industrial harmony' has replaced 'equality of
bargaining power' as the primary justification of our labor law. 'Industrial peace' now includes
extremely broad conceptions of industrial democracy and social integration. The notion that
collective bargaining makes a critical contribution to social harmony and economic self-govern-
ment has become a central theme of contemporary labor relations law and literature.").
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 432 (6th ed. 1990). 1
27. One view holds that the workplace under collective bargaining can be analogized to a
political democracy. Finkin, supra note 15, at 56. Also, Senator Wagner's intention was that
"[d]emocracy in industry must be based on the same principles as democracy in government." 79
CONG. REC. 7571 (1935).
28. See Atkinson, Automating the Workplace: Mandatory Bargaining under OTIS II, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REv. 435, 462-63 n. 232 (referring to adoption of the National Labor Relations Act in
1935: "[Tjhe attempt to abandon earlier notions of the master-servant relationship in favor of
more modern notions of industrial democracy."). For a discussion of the continuing influence of
the law of master and servant on contemporary labor law, see J. ATLESON, VALUES AND As-
SUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 171-80 (1983).
29. The importance of understanding and justifying the distinct functions and prerogatives of
ownership vis-i-vis all employee groups, including managers, was emphasized by Hayek, who
contended that it is in the best interests of the employed - the majority - that there be a
minority group of "independents" who "accept the risk and responsibility of organizing the use
of resources." F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 118-24 (1960).
30. See Fox, supra note 24. See also J. ATLESON, supra note 28, at 62 (maintaining that
American labor law is animated by the belief that it is in the public interest for management to
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ties to the employment relationship do not stand on equal footing due
to the employees' economic dependence on the employer.31
Since the general notions of "democracy" and "industrial democ-
racy" are not very useful for creating a model of democratic industrial
relations for Poland and other East European countries, a model
should be designed on the basis of international standards and West-
ern labor law and practice. In particular, the Conventions and Recom-
mendations of the ILO are of special significance for Polish and other
East European industrial relations.32 They were conceived with the
conditions of various countries, including those of Eastern Europe, in
mind. Additionally, in the past, ILO organs drew attention to Poland
in cases of violation of ILO standards, suggesting changes in labor
legislation.33
Unfortunately, ILO standards are insufficient in that they do not
cover all the aspects of industrial relations, particularly aspects of
trade union freedom. The right to strike is based only on interpreta-
tions by ILO organs. 34 In addition, workers' participation require-
ments are not included in any convention. As a result, the model for
Polish labor law and industrial relations should be influenced by West-
ern labor legislation and practice.
retain full discretion over production methods and goals). Among Atleson's numerous examples
of the pervasiveness of the hierarchical relationship in the area of employee organization is the
observation that "whereas organizational rights are 'granted,' property rights are 'preserved.'"
31. Korn, Collective Rights and Individual Remedies: Rebalancing the Balance After Lingle v.
Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1155 (1990).
32. Even an industrialized country used ILO standards for developing its labor law. See
Sciarra, Regulating European Unions: An Issue for 1992, 11 CoMP. LAB. L. 141 (1990). The
United States used as guidance International Labor Organization conventions (and case law) in
developing standards related to trade union rights and working conditions. See Perez-Lopez,
supra note 12, at 261.
33. See generally the yearly ILO Reports of the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations. In regard to the Polish situation, see Convention No. 87,
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948, International Labour
Office, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommen-
dations, [hereinafter ILO, Report of Committee] 68th Sess. (1982), and Convention No. 98,
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1949, ILO, Report of Committee, 68th Sess.
(1982). Cf, Malanowski, Du Principe de la Libertd Syndicale du Travail dans le Cadre de la
Ldgislation Actuelle en Pologne, 9-10 DROIT SOCIAL 567, 571 (1984).
34. R. BEN-ISRAEL, INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: THE CASE OF THE FREEDOM TO
STRIKE 42-43 (1988). The only specific effort to include a right to strike in the ILO Conventions
was made by the Polish and Czech members in 1949, and it was ruled out of order by the
Chairman of the Conference Committee, who was from New Zealand. The International Labor
Office generally excluded from its drafts any guarantee of the right to strike. Ben-Israel notes that
the refusal to discuss the right to strike in the ILO proceedings may well have been related to the
Cold War. See also Merrifield, Book Review, 10 COMP. LAB. L. 563, 564 (1989) (reviewing R.
BEN-ISRAEL, supra).
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III. THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC
LABOR RELATIONS
Despite differences in labor law and industrial relations in Western
countries, certain common elements exist. These elements enable in-
ternational regulation of democratic industrial relations. The fact that
this regulation is not exhaustive shows that only some elements of
democratic industrial relations are considered common for most of the
nations. If we consider international instruments and Western legisla-
tion, there are three elements which are found in any democratic
country and which are indispensable for democratic industrial rela-
tions: 1) trade union freedom; 2) collective bargaining;35 and 3) the
right to strike.36 These elements are considered to be the three basic
democratic institutions of industrial relations. This essay therefore
deals with "democratic institutions" rather than "industrial democ-
racy," because, as mentioned above, the notion of "industrial democ-
racy" is vague and controversial while the basic term "democratic
institutions" is quite evident and concrete.
The three elements are inter-connected. 37 Trade unions do not
have a goal in themselves but instead protect, advance, defend and
promote occupational or economic rights and interests of workers.
Such assistance to workers cannot be provided without trade union
freedom, collective bargaining and the right to strike. In most indus-
trial relations systems, negotiations between trade unions and employ-
ers are considered to be the very raison d'etre of trade unionism.38
Bargaining and striking, however, require organized labor. The prohi-
35. "[D]emocracy in industry means fair participation by those who work in the decisions
vitally affecting their lives and livelihood .. .[W]orkers ... can enjoy this participation only if
allowed to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."
N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1937, at 20, col. I (quoting Senator Wagner).
36. See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1394, 1395-96 (1971); Blanpain, Trade Union Democracy and Industrial Relations (Intro-
ductory Remarks), 17 BULL. CoMP. LAB. REL. 1 (1988).
37. It is controversial whether collective bargaining and the right to strike are part of trade
union freedom or whether they constitute independent institutions. The first view is presented by
the ILO, which in my opinion could be explained by the fact that international protection of the
right to strike is not independent of, but only related to, trade union freedom. Similarly, the
protection of collective bargaining has been weaker than the protection of trade union freedom.
Before 1981, when the Convention No. 154 concerning collective bargaining was passed, this
protection was based only on the general provision of article 4 of Convention No. 98. In addi-
tion, the number of ratifications of Convention No. 154 is less than the ratifications of Conven-
tion No. 87. Thus, although the presented view of ILO organs guaranteed better international
protection of the right to strike and collective bargaining, they are still considered separate insti-
tutions in most national legislation, due to their specific features, premises and principles as
compared with the freedom of trade union. In addition, recognition of trade union freedom does
not imply necessarily the right to strike, as in the case of public officials.
38. A. GLADSTONE, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 25
(1986).
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bition or substantial restriction of any one of these items thus consti-
tutes an important danger for democracy in industrial relations.
Although the existence of these three institutions is essential for
democratic industrial relations, it is much more difficult to determine
what features and components they should have. In particular, a prob-
lem arises as to how the functioning of these institutions relate to other
rights and interests of similar or equal value which are prevalent in
society.3 9 For example, what limits should be placed on the right of
the parties to exert economic force in their own interest?4O In order to
answer this question, it is necessary to take into consideration more
detailed patterns of democratic industrial relations resulting from in-
ternational standards and Western legislation.4 1
A. Freedom of Trade Unions
The cornerstone of democratic industrial relations is the freedom
of trade unions, also called the freedom of association 42 (for trade
union purposes) or the right of workers to organize. Trade union free-
dom is sometimes divided into individual freedom, also called the right
to organize, 43 and collective freedom. Individual freedom is related to
the relationship between workers and employers, whereas collective
freedom is connected with the rights of unions.44 These two aspects
are often connected, especially in the case of protection against dis-
crimination by anti-union employers, which often requires the protec-
tion of both individual workers and their trade unions.45 In addition,
from the legal point of view, when we talk about "freedom of organi-
zation," we mean two different things: the absence of prohibitions or
39. Blanpain, supra note 36.
40. Bok, supra note 36, at 1396.
41. It is also useful from the point of view presented in Summers, Worker Participation in the
U.S and West Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP.
L. 367, 367-68 (1980) ("The primary value in making comparisons in labor law, it seems to me, is
that it helps us better understand our own system by seeing it from a different perspective....
[W]e may realize that certain elements which we have assumed were essential for the system to
work are more a product of history than of necessity.... [C]omparisons in labor law do open our
minds to the need for change, the possibility for change, and the range of potential solutions.").
42. This term is preferable when we take into consideration the employers' right to organize.
43. Adlercreutz, Sweden, in 10 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 147 (R. Blanpain ed. 1988).
44. Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LA-
BOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 107-08 (R. Blanpain ed. 1988).
45. See Hepple & Fredman, Great Britain, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LA-
BOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 193 (R. Blanpain ed. 1988) (arguing that, under Brit-
ish law, the rights in this case belong to individuals and though they protect a collective freedom,
they cannot be enforced by the trade union but only by the employee against his employer.) It
seems possible, however, that trade unions could use a special procedure against an employer
discriminating against its members.
Spring 1991]
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restraints on organization and the presence of positive guarantees for
its exercise. 46
The basic premises of trade union freedom are outlined in ILO
Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise (1948) and ILO Convention No. 98 on the Right to
Organise and Collective Bargaining (1949). These conventions are
more specific in this respect than other international instruments such
as the International Covenants on Human Rights (1966) 47 or the Eu-
ropean Social Charter (1961).48 In addition, they are complemented
by very detailed interpretations by ILO organs.49
According to Convention No. 87, workers (and employers) have
rights to form and join trade unions of their own choice without prior
authorization (article 2). Consequently, the right to organize belongs
to any workers' group and, thus, legislation should not set the mini-
mum number of members of a trade union too high.50 In other words,
workers can establish a trade union even if they are a minority of the
workforce within a specific plant. The phrase "own choice" also
means that workers can establish or join any trade union regardless of
existing ones (trade union pluralism or multi-unionism).5' Accord-
ingly, trade union freedom implies the right of workers to regulate
their internal rules, programs and affairs without any interference by
public authorities or employers (article 3, section 1 of ILO Convention
No. 87).
These principles are very important for Polish labor relations
since, for many decades, a trade union monopoly was imposed and
regulated under State control. With regard to the right to form and
join a trade union without prior authorization, Polish legislation re-
quired the registration of trade unions by the courts,52 as do many
46. See P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, KAHN-FREUND'S LABOUR AND THE LAW 201
(1983). See also Sciarra, supra note 32, at 153 ("What has historically marked a line of separation
between Britain and other European countries with systems of union pluralism is... the absence
of a legal right to organise").
47. For this reason, both Covenants refer to ILO Convention No. 87.
48. This would be true even if these documents provided a slightly broader protection of
trade union freedom. A comparison of ILO Conventions with other international standards is
presented in N. VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 92 (1979).
49. This particularly involves the interpretations of the Committee of Experts on the Appli-
cation of Conventions and Recommendations and decisions and principles made by the Freedom
of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO.
50. ILO COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNING BODY, DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES
OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION [hereinafter DIGEST OF DECISIONS] (1985) cases 228, 256
and 257.
51. DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 50, cases 222-233.
52. See article 20, 1982 Trade Union Act, supra note 2, regarding the Corporate Body and
right to operate.
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nations. Even when the conditions for granting registration were de-
fined clearly and reasonably, and the procedure of registration was
simple, 53 this requirement was abused after the imposition of martial
law when some courts refused the registration of some politically un-
desirable trade unions. In a new political situation, however, especially
with independent judges and civil rights guarantees, the requirement
of registration would not impair trade union freedom.
1. Protection Against State and Employer Intervention
Trade union rights should be protected from State intervention. 54
This means that public authorities should refrain from any interfer-
ence which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise
thereof (article 1, section 2 of ILO Convention No. 87). In addition,
the State must take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure
that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organize
(article 11 of ILO Convention No. 87). The State should also not dis-
tinguish between various unions (with the exception of certain rights
granted to the most representative union). 55
The State should, however, not only refrain from actively discour-
aging trade unions but also go further and protect the right to organize
from interference by employers. First, this means that workers should
be protected against any kind of discrimination resulting from the use
of freedom of association. In particular, it is evident that so-called
"yellow-dog" contracts, under which workers agree not to join a union
during the term of their employment, should be voided.5 6 Discrimina-
tion against employees "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to... discourage membership in
any labor organization" 57 also should be prohibited. Second, an em-
ployer, like the State, should not distinguish between various unions
acting in its enterprise.
Under Polish conditions, these two aspects of trade union freedom
have changed in significance. Previously, both the establishment of
trade unions and their activities could be subject to State interference,
53. See 1982 Trade Union Act, supra note 2, at art. 19.
54. See Treu, Italy, in 7 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 113 (R. Blanpain ed. 1986) ("[Tirade union freedom operates basically as a
guarantee of the individual's and organisation's right vis-d-vis the State").
55. This distinction should not have the effect of depriving a trade union which is not recog-
nized as being the most representative of the essential means for defending the occupational
interests of its members. See DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 50, case 236.
56. Weiss, supra note 44, at 107; but see Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A
Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1382-85 (1983).
57. Such discrimination is an unfair labor practice by an employer under American law. See
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
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since an independent trade union constituted a danger to the monopo-
listic power. Now, as the State withdraws from both the economy and
industrial relations, the threat of interference is more real from em-
ployers.58 New private employers can hinder and delay the establish-
ment of trade unions in newly founded enterprises or try to restrict the
activity in privatized companies. Thus, a special procedure would be
required to protect workers' concerted activity against unfair labor
practices of employers, as under U.S. law. Currently, the Polish law in
force generally provides only a fine for the violation of the 1982 Trade
Union Act.59
2. Negative Freedom of Association
Another specific aspect of trade union freedom is the freedom not
to join a trade union or to withdraw freely from it, often called the
"negative freedom of association." This freedom also should be con-
sidered a substantial element of political democracy because no one
should be forced to join a trade union. Negative freedom of association
is also important for the internal democracy of trade unions since the
possibility of withdrawing from a trade union is one of its practical
guarantees. It is uncontested (except in Great Britain) 6° that "closed
shop" or union shop arrangements violate the negative trade union
freedom.6' A more difficult question arises as to how far the union is
allowed to provide privileges for its members. Sometimes conflict ex-
ists between support for trade union freedom and negative freedom
protecting workers who are not willing to become union members, 62
especially on the plant level.
This aspect of trade union freedom has not posed serious problems
in Poland so far, due mainly to historical features of Polish industrial
relations. The very high level of unionization (before 1980 - over 90%,
in the 1980s above 60%) and the restrictions imposed on trade unions
have given, until recent times, absolute priority to the defense of posi-
tive trade union freedom of all workers towards the State, making less
relevant - or even non-feasible - the problem of discrimination by
58. This anticipation is based on American experience since one of the two great trends in
American labor relations remains more unfair labor practices committed by employers (a part of
the decline of the percentage of the American workforce belonging to trade unions). See Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1769, 1778-80 (1983) (citing NLRB annual reports from 1950-1980).
59. 1982 Trade Union Act, supra note 2, at art. 53.
60. See Sciarra, supra note 32, at 153.
61. Weiss, supra note 44, at 107. For a British point of view, see Hepple & Fredman, supra
note 45, at 197 ("[T]he right not to belong is not as obvious as the freedom of association").
62. Weiss, supra note 44, at 107.
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the unions themselves. This situation may change in the future, since
competitive trade unions can exert influence upon workers or employ-
ers in order to increase the number of their members.
3. The Scope of Protected Persons
Another important aspect of the democratic framework of indus-
trial relations is the scope of trade union freedom in terms of persons
protected. Convention No. 87 (article 9, section 1) allows only the ex-
clusion of the armed forces and police members. Convention No. 151
(1978) permits the imposition of certain limits on the rights to organ-
ize in the public service, concerning high-level employees whose func-
tion normally is considered policy-making or managerial, or
employees whose duties are of a highly confidential nature (cf. article
1, section 2). Accordingly, apart from these groups of employees, all
others shall enjoy the full right to organize.
This rule was not observed in Poland after 1982, when most public
servants were deprived totally of the right to organize. 63 It should be
noted, however, that in Poland all civil servants, due to certain polit-
ical and ideological premises, become employees, 64 as opposed to, for
example, Germany where generally civil servants are excluded from
labor law and accordingly from trade union freedom. Thus, certain
limits on trade union freedom in the Polish public service should be
allowed, especially with regard to public employees that act on behalf
of the State (where the freedom of trade unions can contradict their
duties 65) and are not considered employees in some other countries.
4. Sanctions and Limits
Important aspects of democratic industrial relations are the sanc-
tions and limits which can be imposed on a trade union. It is obvious
that sanctions should not deprive workers of their representation, but
should only prevent or punish certain activities of a trade union, its
leaders or members. The rights of a trade union can be restricted in
order to protect rights or interests of similar or equal value which are
prevalent in society. 66 Such interests include national security, public
order and the protection of individual rights and freedoms of others.67
63. See Florek, Das Polnische Beamtenrecht, 24 JAHRBUCH FOR OSTRECHT 275, 293 (1983).
64. Id. at 287.
65. See KrUck, Die Koalitionsfreiheit der Offentlichen Bediensteten, in RONILITIONIFVEIHEIn
DER ARBEITNEHNER 1283 (1980).
66. Blanpain, supra note 36.
67. It should be remembered that ILO conventions, specifically Convention No. 87, do not
allow any restrictions of this kind. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOM-
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The practical significance of these limits depends not only on legal
provisions but also on the possibility to use or even abuse them -
which in turn depends on the general political situation and civil rights
in a specific country. This emphasis is very important under Polish
conditions since the introduction of martial law in December 1981 and
the suspension and dissolution of trade unions officially was justified
by the threat to the life of the nation in relation to article 4, section 1
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
5. Internal Trade Union Democracy
Democratic industrial relations are strongly connected with inter-
nal trade union democracy. 68 In particular, collective bargaining can
serve the goals of industrial democracy only if the union is itself demo-
cratic.69 When we consider the legal framework of these relations,
however, internal union democracy imposed by the law presents an
issue of some controversy where this democracy is to be imposed by
the law. The imposition of trade union democracy by State authority
may serve the interests of union members and prevent union corrup-
tion.70 It may prove dangerous, however, in two respects. First, it may
undermine the efficiency of trade union activity, due to the certain
concentration of power and relative room to maneuver at the disposal
of the leaders which permit them to decide and react on the spot
whenever necessary, a danger especially visible in finance and election
issues. The second and even greater danger is that, under the pretext
of introducing democracy into the union structures, the State will
come, if not to dominate union structures, at least to control their
activities. Here arises the famous debate between trade union democ-
racy and union autonomy. Although these two notions are not neces-
sarily incompatible with each other, a risk of conflict admittedly exists
between them.71 Thus, as a rule, the law should not regulate relation-
MENDATIONS 1919-1981, at 4 (1982). For these restrictions, see International Covenant of Eco-
nomic Social and Cultural Rights, art. 8(a).
68. Sometimes the notion of "industrial democracy" includes this aspect of industrial rela-
tions. See Comment, supra note 15, at 441.
Industrial democracy comprehends two distinct elements. First, it describes the idealized
relationship between individuals and their bargaining representatives and those representa-
tives and management. This is democracy in the structural sense, a process by which em-
ployees deal with their union representatives and those representatives in turn work out
agreements with employers. Second, it includes the concept that can also be called work-
place democracy.
Id.
69. See C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON & A. HYDE, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1211 (1982).
70. Id. at 1209.
71. Blanc-Jouvan, Trade Union Democracy and Industrial Relations, 17 BULL. CoMP. LAB.
REL. 7 (1988).
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ships between the union and its members. It can, however, prohibit
undemocratic (unfair) trade unions practices directed against other
trade unions, workers (non-members of a trade union in question) or
employers since these practices are not internal issues of a trade union.
6. The Employer's Right to Organize
Freedom of association also refers to the right of employers to or-
ganize for the defense of their occupational interests. 72 Obviously,
democratic industrial relations require a certain balance between par-
ties, which is not possible without the right to organize on both sides.
Accordingly, employers should have a right to organize similar to that
of workers.73 Polish legislation will guarantee these rights in a special
act.74
B. Democratic Collective Bargaining
The second fundamental democratic institution of industrial rela-
tions is the right to bargain freely with employers with respect to
wages and other terms of employment.75 Collective bargaining should
be independent from the State power. In some countries, this is called
the autonomy of collective bargaining. Accordingly, public authorities
should refrain from any interference which would restrict or impede
the lawful exercise of this right. In particular, the parties in industrial
relations should be allowed to determine independently the level of
collective bargaining (e.g., plant, industry or national) and its scope,
provided that collective bargaining covers wages, working conditions
and other terms of employment. Even though in some countries the
scope of collective bargaining is much broader, 76 this breadth is not
required in terms of democratic industrial relations. The results of col-
72. See ILO Convention No. 87, arts. 1-5. It is a paradox of history that during the discus-
sion on the draft of ILO Convention No. 87 in 1948 Poland and Czechoslovakia were against
spreading the freedom of association to employers, and now both countries are trying to use this
provision to promote and develop the employers' side of industrial relations.
73. This does not mean, of course, that employers will have to establish an organization. For
example, in the United States the individual employer has been strongly inclined to act indepen-
dently in working out his labor and personnel policy. See Bok, supra note 36, at 1405.
74. See Draft Law on Employer Organization of January 18, 1991, reprinted in BUSINESS
NEWS FROM POLAND (Jan. 18, 1991) (NEXIS, Europe Library, Allnws File).
75. See Schregle, Trends in Collective Bargaining: General Introduction, in EUROPEAN CON-
FERENCE ON LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 337 (R. Blanpain ed. 1979) ("collec-
tive bargaining must be seen as an integral part of the Western pluralistic society and its market
economy"); Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 29, 34 (1979) ("[C]ollective bargaining.., has provided millions of workers an effective
voice in industrial government and has brought due process and human dignity to their working
lives.").
76. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 4, at 39.
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lective bargaining should also be independent. Thus, the public au-
thorities should not, as a rule, intervene in order to modify the
contents of collective agreements which have been concluded freely.77
In particular, the prior approval of this agreement by a governmental
authority should not be required. 78 Thus, instead of making the valid-
ity of collective agreements subject to governmental approval, if the
public authority considered that the terms of the proposed agreement
were manifestly in conflict with the economic policy objectives recog-
nized as being in the general interest, the proposal might be submitted
for advice and recommendation to an appropriate consultative body, it
being understood, however, that the final decision in the matter would
rest with the parties to the agreement. 79
All these elements were restricted in Polish legislation. The scope
of collective bargaining was limited and the introduction of broader or
more advantageous workers' rights required statutory or governmen-
tal authorization. 0 In addition, before 1986 the Labor Minister had to
approve the draft of a collective agreement.8' After 1986, the Labor
Minister reserved the right to examine the conformity of the agree-
ment's provisions to law and to the social and economic policy of the
State. If he found that an agreement failed to conform to these guide-
lines, he could refuse to register it (necessary to give a legal effect to an
agreement). If this happened, the refusal would be reviewed by a court
(in the case of violation of law) or by a special joint governmental and
trade union commission (in the case of incompatibility with the State
policy). 82
1. Problems of Democratic Collective Bargaining
A few elements of collective bargaining are not fully precise in
terms of democratic industrial relations. One element of collective bar-
gaining involves the duty to bargain. This duty can be imposed by law
on the employer's side or by both parties through collective bargain-
ing83 (concerning, as a rule, certain specific matters8 4). On one hand,
77. DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 50, case 593.
78. DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 50, case 635.
79. DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 50, case 664.
80. See Florek, Le Nouveau Droit de Conventions Collectives de Travail, DROIT POLONAIS
CONTEMPORAIN, nos. 1-4, at 84-87 (1987).
81. 1974 Labor Code, supra note 3, at art. 241(2).
82. Id. at art. 241(7) (as amended in 1986).
83. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 496-98 (1976); C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 761-64 (2d ed. 1983); Treu,
supra note 54, at 161.
84. In American law, mandatory subjects are the statutorily prescribed "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment" (National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
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imposing the duty through collective bargaining could contribute to
the increased role of collective bargaining and the better resolution of
conflicts in industrial relations."5 On the other hand, it seems to be
sufficient to guarantee trade unions the right to bargain collectively
and the option to force collective bargaining by strike or a threat of
strike.
A second question concerns which trade union is representative
when more than one union exists on a specific bargaining level. Keep-
ing in mind democratic goals, a representative trade union should be
determined by objective criteria in an independent manner.8 6 The rep-
resentative union could be a trade union or trade unions which associ-
ate and represent a majority of workers, or a trade union elected by
workers (majority rule as exists in the United States87). It seems, how-
ever, that given the East European tradition and conditions (i.e., a
high level of unionization), a majority rule similar to the U.S. system
would be unnecessary. The autonomy of collective bargaining would
be impaired if State legislation or a governmental decision tried to ex-
clude the most representative trade union from bargaining.
A third difficult problem of collective bargaining is connected with
its scope in terms of persons protected. The importance of collective
(1988)) about which either party must bargain at the behest of the other. Permissive subjects are
all other lawful items, including a broad array of so-called managerial prerogatives or internal
union affairs, which are often of intense interest to unions or management, respectively, but
about which they cannot demand bargaining if the other party objects. Id. The distinction be-
tween subjects of mandatory bargaining and subjects of optional bargaining was emphasized by
the Borg- Warner decision (NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)).
Accordingly, it established the principle that a whole range of issues - especially issues relating
to investment, production, site location and the like - were not things about which management
was required to bargain under section 8(d) of the Act, although they surely have a powerful
impact on workers' employment prospects and conditions. It is additionally justified by an argu-
ment that "[m]anagement must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the
extent essential for the running of a profitable business." First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981); see also Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work
Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
988, 1013-14 (1984). However, sometimes this dichotomy is considered "rigid and unrealistic."
See St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 631, 649 (1985).
85. This is true especially where, as in American law, it is a duty to bargain in good faith.
See, e.g., Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
86. This is true provided that the determination of the most representative trade union or-
ganization does not affect the right of other trade unions to function in a normal way. See N.
VALTICOS, supra note 48, at 83; see also Rosen, Labor Law Reform: Dead or Alive?, 57 U. DET. J.
URB. LAW 1, 33 (1979-80) ("Because labor policy is premised upon majority rule and representa-
tion orders bind not only the majority and the employer, but also those employees in the bargain-
ing unit who do not favor union representation, it is vitally important that the process by which
majority will is determined be as accurate, fair, and effective as possible.").
87. Bok, supra note 36, at 1397 ("Only the United States has developed the principles of
majority rule and exclusive representation and the process of representation elections with its
network of rules governing campaign tactics and unit determination.").
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bargaining requires that all workers and employers have the right to
bargain collectively. This principle is also laid down in the European
Social Charter (article 6). Yet, as mentioned before, due to certain
political and ideological premises in Poland, all public servants (in-
cluding those acting on behalf of the State) become "workers." Thus,
their coverage by collective bargaining would involve the State author-
ity in this bargaining. For this reason, it would be better to exclude
from collective bargaining public servants engaged in the administra-
tion of the State (article 6 of ILO Convention No. 98). In fact, this
situation exists in many Western countries."8
2. The Role of the State
Another difficult problem of collective bargaining is connected
with the role of the State in the regulation of wages and other terms of
employment.8 9 In each country, the question emerges as to what ex-
tent the terms and conditions of employment should be established
through negotiations between unions and employers and to what ex-
tent by direct governmental action in the form of minimum wages,
compulsory social insurance, protective legislation and the like.90 Ac-
cording to the Western concept of labor relations, the role of the State
should be limited.9' Admittedly, in almost every country State power
regulates terms of employment to a certain extent. 92 As a result, most
West European countries have extensive protective labor legislation.
Generally speaking, we can say that the role of the State in industrial
relations cannot be considered in itself "democratic" or "undemo-
cratic." Such characterizations depend on the State and its role, as
well as the tradition of a specific State.93
88. See International Labour Office: Freedom of Association and Procedures for Determining
Conditions of Employment in the Public Service, International Labour Conference 63rd Session,
Report VII (1) at 40 (1977). In the United States, about twenty states still do not authorize
collective bargaining for state or municipal employees. See St. Antoine, supra note 83, at 636.
89. However, it is accepted that the State creates rules of collective bargaining. See J. WIND-
MULLER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES: A REAP-
PRAISAL 121, 141 (1987). It is also quite obvious that the State gives legal effect to collective
agreements. It should be noticed, however, that there are exceptions to this rule, e.g., Britain,
which still maintains a basic structure of voluntarism or non-regulation of collective bargaining
procedures. See Mueckenberger, Juridification of Industrial Relations: A German-British Com-
parison, 9 COMP. LAB. L. 526, 530 (1988).
90. See Bok, supra note 36, at 1396.
91. See HANDBUCH DER ARBEITSBEZIEHUNGEN (G. Endruweit ed. 1985) for the German,
Austrian and Swiss views.
92. See J. WINDMULLER, supra note 89, at 7. There is a difference between Western Europe
and the United States. In particular, European legislation generally regulates a number of em-
ployment conditions that are left to collective bargaining in the United States. See Bok, supra
note 36, at 1418.
93. For example, in France the State historically has played a major role in regulating the
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In Poland and East Europe, it is quite obvious now that the State
should withdraw from the regulation of most terms of employment,
leaving this to the parties in collective bargaining. Specifically, the
State should not prohibit the improvement of wages and other terms
of employment, as was previously the case. However, it is not clear to
what extent the State should allow parties in collective bargaining to
reduce the terms of employment. Detailed regulation of terms of em-
ployment was not only a characteristic feature of a totalitarian State,
but also protection of workers' rights.94 Accordingly, if we wanted to
allow working conditions to deteriorate through collective bargaining,
it would be necessary to lift protective State legislation because statu-
tory terms of employment could not be worsened by a collective agree-
ment. Yet the question arises as to whether, after the deregulation of
terms of employment, the level of workers' rights so far guaranteed by
State legislation can be achieved through collective bargaining. There-
fore, it seems that the State can not withdraw immediately and totally
from industrial relations, leaving all the issues (e.g., life and health
protection, job security, protection of weaker groups of employees) 95
to collective bargaining, as long as the parties are not sufficiently able
to take social issues into account.
Another problem relating to the role of the State concerns State
participation in collective bargaining. As pointed out above, collective
bargaining should be independent. Such participation could be consid-
ered incompatible with democratic industrial relations, especially if
the State uses its presence to exert pressure on parties in collective
bargaining. If the State merely helps the representatives of labor and
capital to find a compromise, however, this participation should not be
prohibited, even though State participation very often also serves the
economic policy of the State.
C. The Right to Strike
The right to strike is the other essential means, besides collective
bargaining, through which workers and their organizations may pro-
terms of the relationship between worker and employer. In particular, "France has a reputation
for settling by law many problems which are dealt with elsewhere by collective bargaining." See
Aldir, The American Model Unrealized: A Reevaluation of Plant Bargaining in France, 10 COMP.
LAB. L. 196, 197-99 (1989).
94. Existing Polish legislation cannot be evaluated in a uniform way. Some of the old legisla-
tion creates extensive protection, for example, job security legislation. The rest is lagging behind,
especially where issues of working time and holidays are concerned. The parties of collective
bargaining can thus improve the terms of employment in this respect.
95. The American general circulation press increased emphasis upon ensuring the safety,
health and economic security of employees through direct governmental regulation rather than
through collective bargaining. See St. Antoine, supra note 83, at 633.
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mote and defend their economic and social interests. The right to
strike is recognized by the 1966 International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (article 8(d)) and the 1961 European Social
Charter (article 6, paragraph 4). Interpretation by ILO organs has also
confirmed the existence of such a right. It is therefore obvious that
strikes cannot be prohibited absolutely for all workers legally or factu-
ally. Mere recognition of this right, however, is not sufficient; the exer-
cise of this right should also be possible. Given the negative
consequences of work stoppage for a specific enterprise and the inter-
est of the whole economy, most pieces of State legislation provide cer-
tain limits and restrictions of strikes.96 For instance, such legislation
has sought to cover the goals of the strike, conditions of its calling, the
exercise thereof, temporary exclusion from the right to strike and the
prohibition of strikes in certain services. The evaluation of the right to
strike in terms of democratic institutions of industrial relations relates
to these limits and restrictions. Generally speaking, the conditions that
have to be fulfilled under the law in order to render a strike lawful
should be reasonable and, in any event, not such as to place substantial
limitations or restrictions on this right. A temporary restriction on
strikes until a certain procedure for settlement of collective labor dis-
putes is exhausted can be considered reasonable. A strike can be re-
stricted or even prohibited in civil service situations only in the strict
sense of this term, i.e., civil servants acting on behalf of the public
authorities and in essential services, or services where the interruption
of such service would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the
whole or part of the population. 97 A legal strike, however, should not
be considered a breach of the contract of employment. Thus, the dis-
missal of workers or refusal to re-employ them on the claim that the
workers organized or participated in a legal strike constitutes a viola-
tion of the democratic right to strike. 98
Most of these principles were not respected in Poland. Although
the 1982 Trade Union Act provided the right to strike for the first time
96. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS (1974).
See also A. GOLDMAN, LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 267 (1984).
97. DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 50, cases 393 and 394.
98. From this point of view, it may be a controversial issue whether the possibility of perma-
nent replacement of the strikers existing in American law (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938)) is democratic. Unless the strike was provoked by an employer's unfair labor
practice, the employer does not have to reinstate any replaced strikers when the strike ends or
pay any of them their back wages. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 988, 998 (1982). Elimination of an employer's right to replace strikers was suggested by
Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation,
98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 412-14 (1984). See also Fried, supra note 84, at 1014.
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in a Communist country, the exercise of this right has been subject to
many conditions specified in the Act (among others, a quite long pro-
cedure for the settlement of collective disputes which must precede a
strike). The law contains a very long list of public employees and es-
sential services in which strikes are not permitted, although their inter-
ruption would not always endanger the population, e.g., radio or
television. In addition, the above-mentioned 1986 Amendment to the
Labor Code prohibited strikes during collective bargaining. Because of
the difficulty involved with conducting a legal strike, almost all the
strikes in the 1980s were unlawful. 99
IV. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC LABOR RELATIONS
A. Settlement of Disputes
According to most publications on industrial relations, a special
system for the settlement of collective disputes is not considered a nec-
essary element of industrial democracy. This opinion is justified sup-
posedly by the fact that democratic collective bargaining and a
reasonable right to strike sufficiently insure the promotion of workers'
interests in labor relations (which is one of the goals of industrial de-
mocracy). Nevertheless, the creation of a special procedure for settle-
ment of collective labor disputes is often very useful in order either to
prevent or resolve a conflict of interests (in particular during collective
bargaining) or to reduce the number of strikes. 10 Thus, such a proce-
dure may be regarded as a democratic institution in the sense that
employees can achieve similar goals in a peaceful way rather than by
strike. Despite this benefit, the procedure in question should not strip
other democratic institutions from workers, in particular the right to
strike' 0 1 and independent collective bargaining.
B. Workers' Participation
An analysis of Western legislation shows that worker participation
in decision-making within undertakings is not an indispensable part of
industrial relations, although participation does make them more dem-
99. Wildcat strikes also continued after the recognition of the Solidarity unions in 1988.
Despite their illegal character, sanctions were not imposed on the strikers because the general
political climate of the country did not permit the rigid application of the law. See Szubert, supra
note 1, at 68.
100. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION PROCE-
DURES IN LABOUR DISPUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 13 (1980).
101. As mentioned above, strikes can be temporarily restricted, but such restrictions should
be accompanied by an adequate, impartial and speedy settlement procedure in which concerned
parties can participate at every stage. See DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 50, case 390.
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ocratic. 0 2 This conclusion can be reached when we compare Ameri-
can, British and Canadian legislation with German or Austrian
legislation.
One reason the author does not deal with the issue of workers'
participation in this paper is that its future in Poland is unsure. De-
spite a certain tradition of workers' participation and despite the fact
that the power of workers' councils is much stronger than during the
many decades of Communist rule,103 the councils in their existing
form will be dissolved in the course of privatization. In their place,
employees shall elect one-third of the Board of Directors.° 4 As a kind
of political compensation, 0 5 employees of a State enterprise trans-
formed into a corporation shall enjoy the right to acquire on preferen-
tial terms up to 20% of all stocks of the said corporation held by the
State Treasury. 1°6 Though the dissolution of workers' councils in
privatized enterprises can be considered controversial in terms of de-
mocracy, at least two arguments can be given in its support. First, the
functions of trade union councils and workers' councils on the plant
level can be exercised by workers' representatives. Second, the aboli-
tion of workers' councils will diminish the possibility of conflict be-
tween management and workers on an everyday basis, an important
requirement for newly transformed or founded companies. t0 7 The par-
ticipation of workers' representatives in directors' boards and workers'
stock can also contribute to the democratization of industrial rela-
102. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS
WITHIN UNDERTAKINGS 10 (1981); Klare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of
Collective Bargaining Law: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731, 808-09 (1985) ("Of
course collective bargaining is itself a form of worker participation and, as such, an essential
component of industrial democracy. But it is also true that the legal structure of conventional
collective bargaining has not been particularly encouraging toward either day-to-day employee
participation in managing the pace and flow of work or toward co-determination by workers and
management at the level of major capital investment."); EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON LABOUR
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 75, at 235 ("Speaking about participation with-
out relating it to the concept of 'democracy' tends to undermine the essential meaning of our
subject matter."); Sartori, Democracy, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 114 (1968) ("In its ultimate form, industrial democracy calls for self-government by
the workers in a plant.").
103. Since March 1990, workers have been entitled to elect or dismiss the management of a
State-run enterprise. Last year, 90% of management was changed on the initiative of workers'
councils.
104. Act on State Enterprise Privatization of July 13, 1990, art. 17(l), 51 JOURNAL OF LAWS
item 298 (1990).
105. This provision is also related to the workers' lack of capital for buying shares of priva-
tized companies.
106. Act on State Enterprise Privatization of July 13, 1990, supra note 104, at art. 24(1).
107. The abolition of workers' councils was also influenced by the fact that foreign investors
had been against keeping workers' councils in private companies (even where investors came
from countries such as Germany or Austria where the position of workers' councils is very
strong).
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tions, although it is impossible now to anticipate their actual
significance.
V. DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN THE INTRODUCTION OF
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
The introduction of proposed democratic institutions into Polish
and other East European industrial relations encounters certain diffi-
culties and obstacles. There is a difference between trade union free-
dom on the one hand, and collective bargaining and the right to strike
on the other. It is much more difficult to introduce and guarantee in-
dependent collective bargaining and the right to strike than trade
union freedom (even if this freedom could also be subject to many
restrictions). Trade union freedom requires only political change,
while collective bargaining and the right to strike are strongly con-
nected with the economy and social relations of a specific country. In
particular, the introduction of collective bargaining meets three obsta-
cles: (1) the absence of the employers' side of collective bargaining; (2)
the absence of a market; and (3) the lasting economic crisis.
First, the State economy has lacked a factual (genuine) employer
who would object to workers' demands. Managers of State enterprises
have not played this role because they often tried, together with their
employees, to increase wages and to improve other terms of employ-
ment. All this resulted from the deformation of industrial relations
caused when two parties act in the same direction.
Second, no real market existed which featured economic competi-
tion and the risk of bankruptcy which could force an employer to ob-
ject to workers' demands. Both sides of collective bargaining were not
able to determine the ceiling on wage improvement and other terms of
employment since these measures are determined by the market.
Third, for many years, economic conditions conducive to the intro-
duction of collective bargaining have not existed. First, collective bar-
gaining has not been an aim in itself but rather forms one of the means
with which wages and other terms of employment are improved.
When wages do not improve but deteriorate steadily as they do in Po-
land, a tension between parties in collective bargaining could make it
impossible to bargain. This aspect of collective bargaining is especially
visible during economic recession, when employees' pressure to in-
crease their wages intensifies and the possibility of improving working
conditions decreases. Second, some aspects of collective bargaining
may hamper and impede the process of overcoming the economic cri-
sis or restructuring the economy. Recent developments have shown
that there is a continuing tension between the requirements for reviv-
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ing economic activity and reducing inflation on the one hand, and im-
proving working conditions and protecting workers against crisis on
the other. The unlimited vindication of workers' rights, even if socially
justified, can damage the economy because workers and their organi-
zations do not always respect the economic consequences of fulfilling
their demands. 0 8 Third, the decentralized regulation of wages through
collective bargaining may result in the more influential workers receiv-
ing benefits at the expense of others, thus contributing to a rise in the
cost of living and an increase in the inflation rate. 109
As regards the right to strike and collective labor disputes, a tradi-
tion of legally resolving such disputes has not existed, since in the past
most disputes were settled informally and often hidden from public
opinion. As a result, these elements have not been used, although the
existing procedure for settlement of collective disputes contains several
elements shaped along Western patterns, such as negotiations, concili-
ation and arbitrations.tt 0 Although resort to the procedure is required
before a strike, most collective labor disputes have actually begun with
a strike. The procedure also lacks appropriate people who could serve
as mediators (provided in draft legislation"') or arbitrators (so far,
there have been labor judges, but their qualifications were considered
insufficient for solving economic disputes). Under current Polish eco-
nomic conditions, strikes are undesirable since Poland's weak econ-
omy can hardly carry their burden. In addition, since many State
enterprises still hold a monopolistic position, their production, some-
times very important for the whole economy, cannot be substituted by
a supply of another enterprise in the event of a strike. Accordingly, the
question arises as to whether Poland can afford a liberal strike legisla-
tion. A liberal strike legislation can contribute to an increase in the
number of strikes although other factors beyond the liberal framework
also play a role.
It is not clear, however, how illegal strikes can be punished. Previ-
ously, there were penal sanctions which could be applied by the State.
The draft law also keeps the fine as a basic sanction for those who lead
an unlawful strike. This means that the State itself still tries to restrict
the right to strike. The necessary withdrawal of the State from indus-
trial relations also requires a neutral position of the State in industrial
108. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 4, at 39.
109. See Szubert, supra note 1, at 69, citing 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOR RELATIONS: HERI-
TAGE AND ADJUSTMENT (1979), in which the author had made the same observation in relation
to the British practice.
110. See 1982 Trade Union Act, supra note 2, arts. 40-42.
111. See BUSINESS NEWS FROM POLAND, supra note 74, arts. 12-16.
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conflicts, with the exception of situations such as threats to national
welfare. Accordingly, it would be better if sanctions against illegal
strikes were executed by an employer. In case of an illegal strike, the
employer could discharge striking workers or sue a union for money
damages. The only problem is that, in the transitional period from a
State-planned to a market economy, "a real employer" willing to en-
force illegal strikes is generally lacking.
VI. CONCLUSION
Obviously, the transition from a totalitarian system, where the
State power centrally regulates all aspects of societal activity, to a
political democracy, social pluralism and a market economy requires
democratic industrial relations.
Even if we are not in a position to say precisely what democracy
means in industrial relations (especially since there is no model of
democratic industrial relations which can be applied to post-Commu-
nist conditions), we can determine its three basic indispensable ele-
ments: trade union freedom, the right to strike and collective
bargaining. The premises and principles of these institutions presented
above are taken partially from international instruments, and partially
from the main trends of Western labor legislation, taking into consid-
eration the pre-war tradition of the relevant countries.
The application of Western examples to Polish and East European
industrial relations presumes a certain similarity of economic and so-
cial conditions. In particular, it is necessary to establish and solidify
the employer's side of these relations. This can be achieved, first of all,
by property changes, namely, reprivatization of the State sector and
development of the private sector.
The democratic institutions of industrial relations should be pro-
vided and guaranteed by labor legislation. This legislation should only
regulate the basic conditions of democracy in industrial relations and
should not be excessively specific in order to provide the parties the
possibility to shape their relations (this also constitutes one of the ele-
ments of democracy in industrial relations) and to allow trade unions
to regulate their internal democracy. The parties in industrial relations
should also be able to shape wages and other terms of employment
independently (social self-government), with the exception of State
protective legislation.
The principles and premises of democratic institutions in labor re-
lations, as characterized above, can be regarded as modest when com-
pared with the developed systems of industrial relations in democratic
Western countries. They consist of only minimal and indispensable
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conditions and can be completed subsequently through other regula-
tions and institutions which are optional for industrial democracy.
Most importantly, the implementation of these basic democratic insti-
tutions will create a new model of labor relations regulated, not by
State legislation as in the past, but primarily by the autonomous deci-
sions of social partners.
